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Buchanan v. State, 69 P.3d 694 (Nev. 2003).1 
 
Criminal Law – Appeal – Evidence – Jury Instructions 
 
Summary  
 
 Appeal from a judgment by the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County, 
convicting Denise Dianna Buchanan of two counts of first-degree murder.   
 
Disposition 
 
 Affirmed.  The Court upheld Buchanan’s conviction of two counts of first-degree 
murder in the deaths of her sons John and Jacob, and the acquittal of her murder 
conviction regarding the death of her son Jeremiah.  The Court rejected Buchanan’s 
arguments that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction; (2) she 
suffered prejudice by the state’s failure to preserve evidence; (3) the jury instructions 
regarding premeditation, deliberation, and reasonable doubt constituted reversible error; 
(4) the district court erred by allowing the State to present rebuttal evidence; and (5) the 
district court erred by failing to instruct the jury on an advisory verdict of acquittal. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Between 1987 and 1993, Denise Buchanan gave birth to five sons; Joseph, 
Joshua, Jeremiah, John and Jacob.  Except for her first son Joseph, all sons were fathered 
by Francisco Leal, who lived with Buchanan.  Leal testified that while Buchanan was 
very fond of her first son, Joseph, she was disappointed with her second son, Joshua, 
because she wanted a girl.  According to Leal, she clearly favored Joseph over Joshua.  
 Buchanan’s third son Jeremiah died after four months of age.  Dr Terrance 
Young, the pathologist who performed the autopsy, attributed the cause of Jeremiah’s 
death to Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) because he could not determine another 
reasonable cause of death.  
 Buchanan’s fourth son, John, died when he was only three months old.  John was 
brought home with an apnea monitor because Jeremiah’s death had been ruled as a SIDS 
death.  Buchanan called Leal to tell him that the monitor had gone off, after which Leal 
performed CPR on John.  According to the police officer who reported to the call, 
Buchanan was very calm, while Leal appeared distraught.  A paramedic further testified 
that Buchanan had told him that John was a “victim of SIDS” whereas mothers usually 
tell him that their child “stopped breathing.”  Forensic pathologist Dr. Ellen Clark noticed 
capillary bursts beneath the tissue surface of the lungs, which could be a sign of asphyxial 
injury or suffocation, but also could indicate a SIDS case.  She listed the cause of John’s 
death as undetermined.  
 Buchanan’s fifth son, Jacob, a healthy baby, was born in 1993.  Jacob, too, was 
placed on an apnea monitor.  Leal testified that Buchanan had been disappointed again 
because she wanted a girl.  Jacob died just before his first birthday.  According to Leal, 
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this was significant because the doctor told Buchanan that Jacob would be no longer at 
risk for SIDS after his first year.   
Buchanan described the circumstances surrounding Jacob’s death in several ways.  
She told Leal that she had turned off the monitor, became distracted by the dog’s barking 
outside, and returned to find that the baby stopped breathing.  She told the police officer, 
however, that she had turned off the monitor in the morning, did some housework, laid 
down to rest, and forgot to turn the monitor back on.  The representative of the apnea 
monitor testified that the monitor had been shut off at 4:00 in the morning, and not at 
7:00 as Buchanan contended.  
 Pathologist Dr. Samuel Parks ruled out metabolic illnesses, and concluded that the 
cause of Jacob’s death was undetermined.  The Washoe County Coroner, Dr. McCarty, 
listed the cause of Jeremiah’s death as SIDS; the cause of death of John and Jacob as 
undetermined, but listed Jacob’s manner of death as homicide.  Dr. McCarty did so based 
on statistical evidence showing that the incidence of SIDS is only 1 in 1,000 births, and 
that it is almost impossible to have a second SIDS case in the same family.  
 Numerous medical experts were called upon to give their opinion regarding the 
deaths of Buchanan’s three sons.  Dr. Clark, like Dr. McCarty, stated that statistically, it 
was practically impossible to have a second or third SIDS case in one family, and 
concluded that the deaths were a result of homicide based on physical findings and 
surrounding circumstances.  Dr. Roe concluded that another person had caused the 
deaths, most likely by asphyxiation.  Dr. Ophoven testified that many early cases of SIDS 
were misdiagnosed due to insufficient exams and death investigations, in part because it 
was then considered incomprehensible that mothers would kill their babies.  He believed 
that all three children were killed, based inter alia on (1) evidence of physical and 
emotional neglect, (2) Buchanan’s inconsistent stories regarding the circumstances of the 
children’s deaths, and (3) the fact that apnea was never observed by anyone besides 
Buchanan.  Dr. Colletti believed that Jacob died of SIDS, and that John died due to a 
kidney infection.  
 The defense called Dr. Cyril Wecht, who generally concluded that the 
investigation as to all three deaths had not been extensive enough.  The other four defense 
experts were of the opinion that genetic or metabolic diseases attributed the deaths of the 
three children.  The State’s rebuttal witness, Dr. DiMaio, however, saw no evidence of 
any metabolic diseases nor did he see the need to conduct genetic testing.  
 Besides the medical experts, numerous other witnesses testified as to their 
experience with the family, relating Buchanan’s inconsistent stories, her lack of emotion 
regarding the deaths of all three sons, and her neglect and physical abuse of Joshua. 
Appellant Denise Dianna Buchanan, charged with three counts of first-degree 
murder in the deaths of her three infant sons, was tried in the Second Judicial District 
Court of Washoe County.  After a four-week trial, the jury found Buchanan guilty of two 
counts of first-degree murder in the deaths of her sons John and Jacob, while acquitting 
her of murder regarding the death of her son Jeremiah.  Buchanan was sentenced to two 
consecutive terms of life in prison with the possibility of parole.  
 Buchanan appealed her judgment, claiming (1) there was insufficient evidence to 
support her conviction; (2) she suffered prejudice by the state’s failure to preserve 
evidence; (3) the jury instructions regarding premeditation, deliberation, and reasonable 
doubt constituted reversible error; (4) the district court erred by allowing the State to 
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present rebuttal evidence; and (5) the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury on 
an advisory verdict of acquittal.  
 
Discussion 
  
I. Claim that conviction was based on insufficient evidence  
 
In all murder cases, the State is required to prove the corpus delecti.  Specifically, 
the state must prove (1) the fact of death, and (2) the criminal agency of another as the 
cause of death.  As to the second element, the reviewing court must determine “whether, 
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier 
of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that [the decedent’s] death was 
caused by a criminal agency.”2  
The jury determines how much “weight and credibility” to give the various 
testimonies.3  Moreover, the jury may convict a defendant based on circumstantial 
evidence alone.4  Circumstantial evidence is sufficient if all the circumstances taken 
together point to guilt precluding “to a moral certainty” any other theory.5   
In Buchanan’s case, numerous experts testified, resulting in a wide variety of 
conflicting opinions.  Regardless of the array of opinions, it is up to the jury to determine 
the credibility of each expert and to decide which expert to believe.  The jury could 
properly have found Buchanan guilty of killing her children based on the expert 
testimony alone.  Further evidence consisted of testimony relating that Buchanan had 
been unemotional about the deaths of her children, had abused her children, and had told 
inconsistent stories of the events that led to their deaths.  Contrary to Buchanan’s 
contention, the evidence was not solely based on statistical probabilities alone, and was 
sufficient for a jury to find her guilty of murdering her children.   
 
II. Claim regarding the lost or destroyed evidence 
 
Buchanan’s claim that the state’s failure to preserve or gather various tissues of 
the three children deprived her of a fair trial also fails.  
The State’s loss of evidence constitutes a due process violation if the defendant 
can show either that (1) the State acted in bad faith, or (2) “that the defendant suffered 
undue prejudice and the exculpatory value of the evidence was apparent before it was lost 
or destroyed.”6  When arguing prejudice, it is not enough to show that the evidence may 
be helpful in preparing a defense, or that there is a mere hope of a positive conclusion for 
the defense.  Moreover, the evidence sought must be material to the defense.7  
There is no evidence of bad faith on the part of the State, because the murder 
investigation did not start until the third child died.  Law enforcement would not have 
                                                 
2  Frutiger v. State, 111 Nev. 1385, 1389, 907 P.2d 158, 160 (1995). 
3  Frutiger, 111 Nev. at 1391, 907 P.2d at 161. 
4  Hutchins v. State, 110 Nev. 103, 107, 867 P.2d 1136, 1139 (1994). 
5  Walker v. State, 113 Nev. 853, 861, 944 P.2d 762, 768 (1997). 
6  Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 68, 17 P.3d 397, 407 (2001). 
7  See id. 
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known that tissues of the first two children could have any exculpatory value.  Moreover, 
because the children were small, most tissues were consumed during testing.  
There is no evidence of undue prejudice either.  The defendant has the burden of 
proving prejudice.8  Buchanan’s mere hope that an examination of the evidence would 
prove a metabolic or hereditary kidney disease, however, is not enough because she has 
not shown that the lost evidence would have been exculpatory.  Moreover, if Buchanan 
truly expected that exculpatory evidence would have been produced, the defense could 
have conducted hereditary tests on the surviving family members.  Finally, Buchanan’s 
argument that she suffered prejudice for the state’s failure to collect bedding and pajamas 
fails, as she did not show how this evidence would be material to her defense. 
 
III. Claim as to the erroneous jury instructions 
 
The fact that in Byford v. State,9 the Nevada Supreme Court disapproved of the 
Kazalyn jury instruction regarding premeditation and deliberation does not mean that all 
prior convictions using this instruction must be overturned. If the Kazalyn instruction was 
given, the court reviews the evidence to determine if sufficient evidence was presented to 
establish premeditation and deliberation. Here, the evidence showing how long it takes to 
suffocate a child establishes deliberation, whereas premeditation is inferred by the fact 
that two children were killed years apart.  
Finally, Nevada’s reasonable doubt instruction codified in NEVADA REVISED 
STATUTE 175.211 is constitutional.10  Therefore, Buchanan’s claim challenging this 
instruction fails.  
 
IV. Other claims 
 
Buchanan’s claims that the district court should have refused to allow the State’s 
rebuttal testimony, and should have instructed the jury on an advisory verdict of acquittal 
fail.  The court has discretion regarding admitting or refusing rebuttal evidence and may 
equally choose not to issue an advisory verdict. 
 
Concurring opinion by Justice Rose11 
 
 While agreeing with the majority’s analysis and conclusion, Justice Rose had 
concerns about the admission of statistical evidence to show the probability of an event 
occurring, and opined that a defendant ought to be convicted by the evidence, in addition 
to numbers and probabilities.  However, because there was substantial evidence besides 
statistics to establish that the two children died from asphyxiation, Justice Rose concurred 
in the majority’s opinion.   
 
Conclusion 
 
                                                 
8  Sheriff v. Warner, 112 Nev. 1234, 1240, 926 P.2d 775, 778 (1996). 
9  116 Nev. 215, 235, 994 P.2d 700, 713 (2000). 
10  See Noonan v. State, 115 Nev. 184, 189, 980 P.2d 637, 640 (1999). 
11  with whom Justice Leavitt agrees. 
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 This opinion reaffirms that circumstantial evidence may suffice to convict a 
defendant.  The opinion further emphasizes that an abundance of conflicting expert 
testimony does not mean that there is insufficient evidence to convict a defendant.  
Rather, it is for the jury to weigh the evidence and to determine which witnesses to 
believe. 
 It is possible that the Nevada Supreme Court, following Justice Rose’s 
admonition, would in the future overturn a conviction if the conviction was based on 
statistical evidence alone.  While the Court did not specifically allude to such possibility, 
it specifically stated that the evidence on which Buchanan was convicted was not solely 
based on statistical probabilities.  This would suggest that something more than statistical 
evidence is needed to convict a defendant for murder.  
 
